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While the quality of a bank's management is generally acknowledged to be a key 
contributor to a financial institutional failure, it is usually not calculated for lack of an 
objective measure. This paper presents a new paradigm approach for quantifying a bank's 
managerial efficiency, using a data envelopment analysis (DEA) model that combines 
multiple inputs and outputs to compute a scalar measure of efficiency and management 
quality. The analysis of the largest 50 Brazilian banks over a twelve-year period from 
1995 to 2006 shows significant differences in management quality scores between 
institutions. Hence, this new metric provides an important, but previously missing, 
modelling element for the early identification of troubled banks and can be used as a tool 
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INTRODUCTION  
Over the past two decades, extensive research done by financial economists in 
government and academia from all over the world has gone into evaluating the efficiency 
of financial institutions.   
The vast majority of these studies were published in the 1990s, highlighting the 
importance and greater frequency of this research in recent years. For example, Berger 
and Humphrey (1997) survey 130 studies that apply frontier efficiency analysis to 
financial institutions in 21 countries.   
This paper uses the approach developed by Barr et al. (1992, 1993, 1994, 1997, 1998) for 
quantifying a bank’s managerial efficiency, using an input-oriented data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) model that combines multiple inputs and outputs to compute a scalar 
measure of efficiency. This measure captures a fundamental and crucial element of a 
bank’s success, which is its management efficiency. 
In the US, bank examiners evaluate a bank’s health using an overall rating system called 
CAMEL, based on Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management quality, Earnings 
ability and Liquidity position. Financial data are the main source for scoring Capital , 
Asset , Earnings and Liquidity, but assessing Management is a more difficult and 
subjective matter.   
To assess a bank’s management quality, it requires professional judgment of a bank’s 
compliance to policies and procedures, aptitude for risk-taking, development of strategic 
plans and the degree of bank managers in the decision making process. As Seballos and 
Thompson (1990) ¨the ultimate determinant of whether or not a bank fails is the ability of 
its management to operate the institution efficiently and to evaluate and manage risk.¨   
Still, few research papers have attempted to quantify objectively management quality 
performance measures. And that is the purpose of this paper, to quantify banks´ 




Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
DEA is a non-parametric frontier estimation methodology initiated by Charnes, Cooper 
and Rhodes (1978), which constructs an empirical production function that is used to 
compute a bank’s transformational efficiency relative to its peers.   
More precisely, DEA is a non-parametric estimation method which involves the 
application of mathematical programming to observed data to locate a frontier that can 
then be used to evaluate the efficiency of each of the organizational units responsible for 
the observed output and input quantities.   
There are at least four frontier analysis methodologies used to compute financial 
institution efficiency, and there is no consensus among researchers on which method is 
best. 
The approaches differ mainly in how they handle random error and their assumptions 
regarding the shape of the efficient frontier. The three main parametric methodologies 
include the stochastic frontier approach (SFA), the thick frontier approach (TFA), and the 
distribution-free approach (DFA). 
In general, parametric approaches specify a functional form for the cost, profit, or 
production relationship among inputs, outputs, and environmental factors, and allow for 
random error.   
A more useful benchmarking paradigm should have the following attributes: 
- a solid economic and mathematical underpinning, 
- alternative actual and composite/hypothetical best-practice units, 
- the ability to take into account the trade-offs and substitutions among the 
benchmark metrics, and 
- a means to suggest directions for improvement on the many organizational 
dimensions included in the study. 
Data envelopment analysis, or DEA, is a non-parametric frontier estimation methodology 
with the above attributes. DEA computes the relative technical (or productive) efficiency 
of individual decision-making units by using multiple inputs and multiple outputs.  
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DEA has proven to be a valuable tool for strategic, policy, and operational problems, 
particularly in the service and nonprofit sectors. Its usefulness to benchmarking is 
adapted here to provide an analytical, quantitative benchmarking tool for measuring 
relative productive efficiency.   
In general, DEA focuses on technological, or productive, efficiency rather than economic 
efficiency. For the purpose of this paper, productive efficiency focuses on levels of inputs 
relative to levels of outputs. To be productively efficient, a firm must either maximize its 
outputs given inputs or minimize its inputs given outputs.   
Allocative efficiency is about doing the right things, productive efficiency is about doing 
things right, and economic efficiency is about doing the right things right. DEA was 
developed specifically to measure relative productive efficiency, which is the focus here. 
DEA generalizes the Farrell (1957) single-output/single-input technical efficiency 
measure to the multiple-output/multiple-input case. DEA optimizes on each individual 
observation with the objective of calculating a discrete piecewise linear frontier 
determined by the set of Pareto-efficient decision making units (DMUs) in the case of 
this paper each individual bank.   
Using this frontier, DEA computes a maximal performance measure for each DMU 
relative to all other DMUs. The only restriction is that each DMU lie on the efficient 
(external) frontier or be enveloped within the frontier. The DMUs that lie on the frontier 
are the best practice organizations and retain a value of one; those enveloped by the 
external surface are scaled against a convex combination of the DMUs on the frontier 
facet closest to it and have values somewhere between 0 and 1. 
Several different mathematical programming DEA models have been proposed in the 
literature (see Charnes et al., 1994). Essentially, these various models each seek to 
establish which of n DMUs determine the envelopment surface, or best practice 
efficiency frontier. The geometry of this envelopment surface is prescribed by the 
specific DEA model employed. 
As such, DEA is a methodology directed to frontiers rather than central tendencies.  
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Instead of trying to fit a regression line through the center of the data, DEA “floats” a 
piecewise linear surface on top of the observations. The focus of DEA is on the 
individual observations in contrast to the focus on the averages and estimation of 
parameters associated with regression approaches. Because of this unique orientation, 
DEA is particularly adept at uncovering relationships that remain hidden from other 
methodologies. DEA produces relative efficiency measures.   
DEA selects the weights that maximize each firm’s productive efficiency score as long as 
no weight is negative and the weights are universal; that is, any firm should be able to use 
the same set of weights to evaluate its own efficiency ratio, and the resulting ratio must 
not exceed one. So, for each firm, DEA maximizes the ratio of its own total weighted 
output to its own total weighted input. In general, the model will put higher weights on 
those inputs the firm uses least and those outputs the firm produces most. 
 
Bank Examiner Rating System - CAMEL   
The model used in this paper uses data envelopment analysis (DEA) to establish a proxy 
for the ´M´ - Management in the CAMEL rating system for banks in Brazil. This new 
paradigm for assessing a bank’s management quality was developed by Barr et al. (1992, 
1993, 1994, 1998), and it views a bank as processing multiple inputs to produce multiple 
outputs and focuses on its key financial intermediation functions of acquiring deposits 
and making loans and investments. 
In the early 1970s regulators of federal financial institutions in the US, realizing the 
advantages of a standardized framework for the examination process, developed a rating 
system whereby the most critical components of a financial institution’s overall safety 
and soundness could be identified, measured, and quantified.   
In 1979, the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System was adopted. Commonly 
referred to by the acronym of its component parts, the CAMEL rating, the outcome of an 
on-site examination of a financial institution, has become a concise and indispensable 
tool for examiners and regulators.  
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The evaluation factors that comprise an institution’s CAMEL






The Commercial Bank Examination Manual produced by the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System describes the five composite rating levels as follows: 
 
CAMEL = 1 An institution that is basically sound in every respect. 
CAMEL = 2 An institution that is fundamentally sound but has moderate weaknesses. 
CAMEL = 3 An institution with financial, operational, or compliance weaknesses that 
give cause for supervisory concern. 
CAMEL = 4 An institution with serious financial weaknesses that could impair future 
viability. 
CAMEL = 5 An institution with critical financial weaknesses that render the probability 
of failure extremely high in the near term. 
Research involving efficiency and CAMEL ratings is somewhat limited, due in large part 
to the restricted nature of the CAMEL ratings themselves, which are not public 
information. The CAMEL rating of an institution is held in strict confidence by bank 
regulators. The composite rating is divulged by bank regulators only to the management 
of the examined financial institution itself; the CAMEL component ratings are kept 
internal to the bank regulatory agencies.   
So the approach developed in this paper is to use an input-oriented DEA model that 
would be used as a proxy for the M – the Management factor in the CAMEL rating for 
banks in Brazil. In this sense, a bank’s DEA efficiency score from this model could be 
taken as a good proxy for managerial quality and could be used by the Central Bank of 
Brazil as an off-site surveillance tool to reduce the need for on-site examinations. 
                                                           
1  Note: In 1997, a sixth component was added – Sensitivity to market risk. Each of the factors is scored 
from ‘one’ to ‘five’, with ‘one’ being the strongest rating. Additionally, a single composite CAMELS 
rating is determined from these components, and represents the findings of the examination for the 
institution as a whole.  
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BANK MANAGEMENT QUALITY MEASURE - DEA MODEL 
In their approach Barr et al. capture the efficiency of a bank’s management, the ´M´ - 
Management in the CAMEL system, with a transformational efficiency model described 
by multiple inputs and multiple outputs. The model uses data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) to measure a bank’s performance relative to others. 
This is a new approach for quantifying a bank’s managerial efficiency, using a DEA 
model that combines multiple inputs and outputs to compute a scalar measure of 
efficiency; this new metric captures an elusive yet crucial element of institutional success 
– a bank’s management quality.   
US bank examiners evaluate a bank’s situation with an overall rating based on Capital, 
Asset, Management, Earnings and Liquidity, the so-called CAMEL rating system, 
developed in the 1970´s. Four of the five CAMEL factors can be calculated from balance 
sheet and income statement data. The variable that is usually missing from financial data 
is the one which assesses management quality - M. This paper uses the model developed 
by Barr et al. around a new paradigm for assessing a bank’s management quality.   
This new paradigm views a bank as processing multiple inputs to produce multiple 
outputs and focuses on its key financial intermediation functions of acquiring deposits 
and making loans and investments. Using data envelopment analysis (DEA), scores for 
banks in Brazil are calculated yearly for the period 1995-2006. The result is an advance 
for the off-site supervision of banks´ management quality.   
Overall, bank managers must integrate policies and techniques for transforming inputs 
(resources) into outputs, for managing the money position providing liquidity, lending 
profitably, and investing rationally into a practical asset/liability management framework. 
The most efficient banks do this by controlling operating expenses, managing interest 
rate sensitivity, utilizing risk management techniques and strategically planning for the 
bank and its future markets. 
In their research, Barr et al. confirm that the quality of management is crucial to a bank’s  
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survival. 
In this paper, we use an input-oriented data envelopment analysis (DEA) model to 
benchmark the productive efficiency of banks in Brazil. Using the DEA model developed 
by Barr et al. (1992, 1993, 1994, 1997, 1998, 1999), we measure relative productive 
efficiency of these financial institutions over a 12-year period from 1995 to 2006. 
In the Barr et al. model, a bank is a transformer of multiple inputs into multiple outputs 
and a bank’s DEA efficiency score from this captures the essential financial 
intermediation functions of a bank. 
The DEA model approximates the decision-making nature of bank management by 
incorporating the necessary input allocation and product mix decisions needed to attract 
deposits and make loans and investments. In this paper, the input-oriented DEA model 
has four inputs and three outputs. The inputs represent resources required to operate a 
bank: number of employees, labor costs, number of branches, and funding costs. The 
outputs represent desired outcomes: deposits, savings and interest income.   
According to this model, productively efficient banks, or best-practice banks, allocate 
resources and control internal processes by effectively managing their employees, 
facilities, expenses, and sources and uses of funds while working to maximize earning 
assets and income. 
 
DATA 
The source for the data used in this paper is the Central Bank of Brazil website 
(www.bacen.gov.br). In its website, the Central Bank of Brazil publishes quarterly data, 
balance sheets and income statements, from 1995 concerning the 50 largest banks in the 
Brazilian financial system, which represent more than 90% of the banking system in 
terms of total assets. All the data for the multiple inputs and outputs used in this paper’s 
DEA model were taken directly from this website, using end of the year data from 1995 




The software used in this paper to calculate the DEA frontier is called OnFront. 
Economic Measurement and Quality (EMQ) was established in 1993 by a team of 
professional economists and it has developed OnFront, a software for measuring 
economical productivity and quality. The efficiency and productivity measures in 
OnFront include Malmquist productivity indexes and DEA. OnFront was developed by 
the originators of the Malmquist productivity index. 
This software constructs a benchmark for each individual organization that is based on 
actual observed achievements in similar organizations. This benchmark is called the best 
practice frontier. This is sometimes also referred to as the reference technology, 
production frontier or just technology. The frontier is constructed from observations of 
what is called inputs and outputs. 
For a reference technology, the model in this paper exhibits Variable Returns to Scale - 
VRS, the intensity variables are restricted to sum exactly one, rather than Constant 
Returns to Scale - CRS, where proportional changes in outputs require proportional 
changes in inputs. Also in this paper, the model uses Strong Disposability of Inputs, i.e., 
if inputs are held the same, or increased, then output will not decrease. Strong 
disposability of inputs means that an increase in inputs cannot decrease outputs.   
 
RESULTS 
The results of the input-oriented DEA model efficiency scores of the 50 largest banks in 
Brazil from 1995 to 2006 are presented in the Appendix. Banks are ranked by size from 
larger to smaller. DEA efficiency scores cannot be compared from year to year because 
they reveal relative efficiencies for the time period under analysis, meaning that they are 
only comparable with peer scores for each specific year. Also, the group of 50 largest 
banks is different from the previous year, due to mergers, acquisitions, bank failures, and 
changes in the banks´ rankings. 
For each of the years in the period analyzed, around half of the 50 banks have efficiency 
scores of 1.00, which represent the best-practice organizations, the institutions that are on  
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the efficiency frontier, and the other half of the banks show an efficiency score below the 
best-practice institutions, or below 1.00 in every year.   
Additionally, the five largest Brazilian banks, among them two public banks, namely 
Banco do Brasil (BB) and Caixa Econômica Federal (CEF), and the three largest 
privately-owned banks, namely Bradesco, Itaú and Unibanco, all reveal an efficiency 
score of 1.00 in each year during this period. That finding is surprising since there is 
strong criticism in Brazil against publicly-owned banks that are supposedly inefficient. 
But in the DEA model used here, the largest public banks show scores that are as 
efficient as the ones in the largest private banks. 
The average input-oriented DEA efficiency score for the 50 largest banks has changed 
significantly between 1995 and 2006, with a minimum score of 0.74 in 2002 and a 
maximum score of 0.87 in 2005. For 2006, the average score was 0.82. The minimum 
efficiency score for each year also has varied along these years, going from 0.41 in 1996 
to 0.18 in 2005. This means that the least efficient banks have become even less efficient 
in the period under analysis.   
An illustrative example is a bank named Santos, its efficiency score evolved as follow: 
1.00 in 2000, 0.43 in 2001, 0.26 in 2002, 0.62 in 2003 and 0.66 in 2004. Not surprisingly, 
the clear deterioration of its DEA score initially demonstrated its weakening efficiency, 
which translated into a Central Bank  intervention  in  2004.     
Another surprising descriptive example refers to the Spanish bank Santander, which 
acquired bank Banespa, the largest state-owned bank in Brazil, in 2000. Previous to 
Santander´s acquisition, Banespa had efficiency scores of 1.00 in every year from 1995 to 
2000, while Santander had an efficiency score of 0.47 in 1999. After the acquisition, 
Santander efficiency score evolved as follows: it increased from 0.72 in 2000 to 0.8 in 
2001, and then decreased to 0.68 in 2002; but it increased again to 0.74 in 2003, to only 
decrease once more to 0.71 in 2004, and 0.69 in 2005; and finally increased once again to 
0.79 in 2006. This shows a completely different view from the mainstream analysis that 
Banespa was an inefficient bank, while Santander, as a foreign bank, was efficient. Using 
the DEA model developed in this paper, the results are the opposite, Santander was an  
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inefficient bank when it acquired Banespa, and on average Santander improved its 
efficiency score during the post-acquisition period. 
Still an unexpected result is the one that refers to another Spanish bank, BBVA. It 
consistently had very low and decreasing efficient scores according to the DEA model 
developed in this paper, 0.39 in 1998, the year BBVA started its operation in Brazil, to 
0.40 in 1999, 0.38 in 2000, 0.33 in 2001 and 0.33 in 2002. Not surprisingly, BBVA sold 
in 2003 its business in Brazil to Bradesco, the largest privately owned bank in the 
country.  
These unpredicted findings corroborate the usefulness of the DEA model efficiency 
scores calculated using data from the Central Bank of Brazil, to assess a bank’s 
management quality.   
 
CONCLUSION   
The financial institution efficiency literature is both large and relatively recent. Berger 
and Humphrey (1997) report that 116 out of the 130 studies that apply frontier analysis to 
determine financial institution efficiency were published from 1992 to 1997. Berger and 
Humphrey also report that there are now enough frontier analysis studies to draw some 
tentative comparisons of average efficiency levels both across measurement techniques 
and across countries, as well as outline the primary results of the many applications of 
efficiency analysis to policy and research issues. They find that overall, depository 
financial institutions banks, savings and loans, and credit unions experience annual 
average technical efficiency ratios of around 77%
2 (median  82%).  
DEA is a non-parametric frontier analysis estimation methodology initiated by Charnes et 
al. (1978), which constructs an empirical production function that is used to compute a 
bank’s transformational efficiency relative to its peers. More precisely, DEA is a 
non-parametric estimation method which involves the application of mathematical 
programming to observed data to locate a frontier which can then be used to evaluate the 
                                                           
2  A 77 % efficiency measure typically means that if the average firm were producing on the frontier 
instead of at its current location, then only 77 % of the resources currently being used would be necessary 
to produce the same output (or meet the same objectives).   
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efficiency of each of the organizational units responsible for the observed output and 
input quantities. As such, DEA is a methodology directed to frontiers rather than central 
tendencies. DEA is an alternative and a complement to traditional central-tendency 
(statistical regression) analyses, and it provides a new approach to traditional cost–benefit 
analyses and frontier (or best-practices) estimation. DEA is a linear-programming based 
technique that converts multiple inputs and multiple outputs into a scalar measure of 
relative productive efficiency. Thus, the initial problem is the construction of an 
empirical production frontier based on the observed data. DEA constructs such an 
empirical production frontier. More precisely, DEA is a non-parametric frontier 
estimation method that involves applying linear programming to observed data to locate 
the best-practice frontier. This frontier can then be used to evaluate the productive 
efficiency of each of the organizational units responsible for the observed output and 
input quantities.   
Bank supervision includes on-site examination and off-site surveillance. The role of 
off-site bank supervision entails mostly continuous monitoring of profitability, risk and 
capital adequacy. This involves using financial data to schedule and plan on-site exams. 
Off-site surveillance also helps supervisors plan on-exams by highlighting risk exposures 
at specific institutions. 
The utilization of bank management quality as measured by DEA scores, such as those 
calculated in this paper using data from the Central Bank of Brazil, has significant 
potential as an instrument of indirect supervision to identify potential risks in banks 
before they materialize. 
In this research paper, we used an input-oriented DEA model to evaluate the relative 
productive efficiency of banks in Brazil. The goal is to benchmark the productive 
efficiency of banks and this is accomplished by comparing the volume of services 
provided and resources used by each bank with those of all other banks in each year.   
The new idea is that this productive efficiency measure can provide an indicator to 
benchmark performance and is conceptually superior to measures produced using 
common gap analysis methodologies. Previous research has shown that more efficient  
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banks tend to be higher performers and safer institutions.   
The multiple input-output DEA model used in this paper is an objective measure to 
quantify management quality in banks in Brazil. Management is indeed important to the 
successful operation of a bank and the quality of management is crucial for a bank’s 
survival.   
It is therefore imperative that bank managers and regulators understand where banks 
stand relative to competitors and best practices regarding their productivity. A more 
inclusive multiple-input, multiple-output framework for evaluating productive efficiency 
and providing benchmarking information on how to become a well-managed bank seems 
essential to improving decision making at poorly managed banks. 
The calculated DEA efficiency scores can be useful as a complementary off-site 
monitoring tool for bank regulators. Its usefulness to benchmarking is adapted here to 
provide an analytical, quantitative benchmarking tool for measuring relative productive 
efficiency. Banks with low efficiency scores should be closely monitored. 
While the quality of a bank's management is generally acknowledged to be a key 
contributor to a financial institutional failure, it is usually not calculated for lack of an 
objectively measure. This paper presents a new paradigm approach for quantifying a 
bank's managerial efficiency, using a DEA model that combines multiple inputs and 
outputs to compute a scalar measure of efficiency and management quality. An analysis 
of the largest 50 Brazilian banks over a twelve-year period shows significant differences 
in management-quality scores between institutions in this period. Hence this new metric 
provides an important, yet previously missing, modelling element for the early 
identification of troubled banks and can be used as a tool for off-site bank supervision in 
Brazil.  
A suggestion for further research is to use the CAMEL scores from the Central Bank of 
Brazil and compare them to the DEA model scores developed in this paper and contrast 
them to check whether they are significantly different or not. But since CAMEL scores 
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Input-oriented DEA scores for largest 50 Brazilian banks from 1995 to 2006 
2006 Fi(y,x/V,S)  2005 Fi(y,x/V,S) 2004  Fi(y,x/V,S)
BB   1,00  BB   1,00  BB   1,00 
BRADESCO   0,97  CEF   1,00  CEF   1,00 
CEF   1,00  BRADESCO   1,00  BRADESCO   1,00 
ITAU   1,00  ITAU   1,00  ITAU   1,00 
ABN  AMRO  1,00  UNIBANCO   1,00  UNIBANCO   1,00 
SANTANDER BANESPA  0,79  SANTANDER BANESPA  0,69  SANTANDER BANESPA    0,71 
UNIBANCO  0,89  ABN AMRO    0,88  ABN AMRO    1,00 
SAFRA   1,00  SAFRA   1,00  SAFRA   1,00 
HSBC   0,73  HSBC   0,68  HSBC   0,79 
VOTORANTIM   1,00  VOTORANTIM   1,00  NOSSA  CAIXA   1,00 
NOSSA CAIXA  1,00  NOSSA CAIXA    1,00  VOTORANTIM    1,00 
CITIBANK   1,00  CITIBANK   1,00  CITIBANK   1,00 
UBS  PACTUAL   1,00  BANKBOSTON   1,00  BANKBOSTON   1,00 
BANRISUL   0,93  PACTUAL   1,00  BNB   0,55 
BBM  0,76  BANRISUL   0,98  BANRISUL   0,97 
BNB   0,62  BNB   0,64  CREDIT  SUISSE   0,95 
ALFA   1,00  BBM   0,31  ALFA   0,26 
DEUTSCHE   0,52  ALFA   0,34  JP  MORGAN  CHASE   0,36 
CREDIT  SUISSE   0,55  DEUTSCHE   0,53  PACTUAL   1,00 
JP MORGAN CHASE    0,35  JP MORGAN CHASE    1,00  SANTOS - Sob Intervenção  0,66 
FIBRA   1,00  CREDIT  SUISSE   0,64  BNP  PARIBAS   0,25 
BIC   0,34  BIC   0,28  BBM   0,56 
BNP PARIBAS  0,25  BNP PARIBAS    0,26  RURAL    0,65 
BASA   0,94  BASA   1,00  DEUTSCHE   0,33 
BANESTES   1,00  BMG   0,52  BIC   0,35 
BMG   0,63  BANESTES   0,93  BASA   0,65 
BESC    1,00  MERCANTIL DO BRASIL  0,48  MERCANTIL DO BRASIL    0,49 
MERCANTIL  DO  BRASIL 0,63 RABOBANK    1,00  RABOBANK    1,00 
IBIBANK   1,00  FIBRA   1,00  BANESTES    0,91 
ABC-BRASIL   0,44  ABC-BRASIL   0,44  FIBRA   1,00 
RABOBANK   1,00  BESC   0,72  BMG   1,00 
SS   1,00  IBIBANK   1,00  SS   1,00 
BANCOOB   0,58  SS   1,00  ABC-BRASIL   0,47 
PINE   0,72  RURAL   0,60  CRUZEIRO  DO  SUL   0,53 
ING    1,00  CRUZEIRO DO SUL    0,51  BESC    1,00 
BRB   1,00  BRB   1,00  IBIBANK   1,00 
DAYCOVAL   0,79  BANCOOB   1,00  BRB   1,00 
BMC   0,54  PINE   0,77  BANCOOB   0,63 
CLASSICO   1,00  BEC   1,00  BMC   0,29 
BANSICREDI   1,00  AMEX   0,18  DRESDNER   0,40 
BARCLAYS   1,00  BMC   0,40  CREDIT  LYONNAIS   0,59 
CRUZEIRO DO SUL  0,50  CLASSICO    1,00  AMEX    0,22 
SOFISA   0,92  DAYCOVAL   0,59  WESTLB   1,00 
BGN   0,35  ING   1,00  BEC   1,00 
WESTLB   1,00  SOFISA   0,74  CLASSICO   1,00 
RURAL   0,62  BANSICREDI   0,80  BCO  JOHN  DEERE   1,00 
BCO  JOHN  DEERE   1,00  WESTLB   1,00  SOFISA   1,00 
SCHAHIN   1,00  BCO  JOHN  DEERE   1,00  PINE   0,88 
BANESE   1,00  SOCIETE  GENERALE   1,00  ING   1,00 
BANIF   0,42  BGN   0,48  DAYCOVAL   0,59 




2003 Fi(y,x/V,S)  2002 Fi(y,x/V,S)  2001 Fi(y,x/V,S) 
BB   1,00  BB   1,00  BB   1,00 
CEF   1,00  CEF   1,00  CEF   1,00 
BRADESCO   1,00  BRADESCO   1,00  BRADESCO   1,00 
ITAU   1,00  ITAU   1,00  ITAU   1,00 
UNIBANCO   1,00  UNIBANCO   1,00  SANTANDER  BANESPA   0,80 
ABN  AMRO   1,00  SANTANDER  BANESPA   0,68  UNIBANCO   1,00 
SANTANDER BANESPA    0,74  ABN AMRO    0,77  ABN AMRO    1,00 
SAFRA   1,00  CITIBANK   1,00  SAFRA   1,00 
NOSSA CAIXA    1,00  NOSSA CAIXA    1,00  BANKBOSTON    1,00 
HSBC   0,83  HSBC   0,99  CITIBANK   1,00 
CITIBANK   1,00  BANKBOSTON   1,00  NOSSA  CAIXA   1,00 
VOTORANTIM   1,00  SAFRA   1,00  HSBC   0,71 
BANKBOSTON   1,00  VOTORANTIM   0,62  SUDAMERIS   0,74 
BNB   0,65  SUDAMERIS   0,65  BBA-CREDITANSTALT   0,91 
BANRISUL   0,87  BILBAO  VIZCAYA   0,33  VOTORANTIM   0,55 
CREDIT SUISSE    1,00  BANRISUL    0,84  BILBAO VIZCAYA    0,33 
SANTOS   0,62  BNB   0,81  BNB   0,31 
ALFA    0,58  JP MORGAN CHASE    0,21  BANRISUL    0,78 
JP  MORGAN  CHASE   0,25  LLOYDS   0,81  LLOYDS   0,74 
RURAL   0,77  SANTOS   0,26  MERCANTIL  SP   0,44 
PACTUAL   0,58  ALFA   0,35  DEUTSCHE   0,81 
DEUTSCHE   0,33  RURAL   0,35  JP  MORGAN  CHASE   0,20 
BASA   0,57  BASA   0,26  CREDIT  SUISSE   1,00 
BIC   0,62  BNP  PARIBAS   0,36  PACTUAL   1,00 
BBM   0,72  CREDIT  SUISSE   1,00  SANTOS   0,43 
BNP  PARIBAS   0,32  FIBRA   1,00  ALFA   1,00 
FIBRA   1,00  WESTLB   0,33  RURAL   0,63 
MERCANTIL DO BRASIL  0,63  ABC-BRASIL    1,00  BASA    0,34 
RABOBANK   1,00  RABOBANK   1,00  ABC-BRASIL   1,00 
BANESTES   1,00  PACTUAL   0,59  BNL   0,53 
BESC   0,84  ING   1,00  MERCANTIL  DO  BRASIL  0,61 
ABC-BRASIL    0,60  MERCANTIL DO BRASIL  0,42  BNP PARIBAS    0,38 
SS   1,00  BIC   0,39  EUROPEU  0,33 
BMC   0,70  TOKYOMITSUBISHI   1,00  DRESDNER   1,00 
WESTLB   1,00  BANESTES   0,74  BRASCAN   0,50 
CRUZEIRO  DO  SUL   0,74  DRESDNER   0,42  BANESTES   0,94 
BMG   0,79  DEUTSCHE   0,38  FIBRA   1,00 
TOKYOMITSUBISHI   0,73  BNL   0,57  ING   1,00 
ING   1,00  BESC   0,70  TOKYOMITSUBISHI   1,00 
BRB   1,00  BRASCAN   0,58  BIC   0,43 
BANCOOB   1,00  SS   1,00  BESC   1,00 
BVA   1,00  BRB   1,00  RABOBANK   1,00 
LLOYDS   1,00  SOFISA   0,55  SS   1,00 
BNL   0,71  BMC   0,48  BBM   1,00 
DRESDNER   1,00  BMG   0,61  BRB   1,00 
BEC   1,00  SMBC   1,00  BEG   1,00 
PINE   1,00  BANCOOB   1,00  SMBC   1,00 
SOFISA   0,89  SUL  AMERICA   1,00  PROSPER   1,00 
SMBC   1,00  BBM   1,00  BARCLAYS  GALICIA   1,00 
CACIQUE   0,88  BEC   1,00  BMC   0,68 
AVERAGE 0,84  AVERAGE 0,74  AVERAGE 0,80  
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2000  Fi(y,x | V,S)  1999  Fi(y,x | V,S)  1998  Fi(y,x | V,S) 
BB   1,00  BB   1,00  BB   1,00 
CEF   1,00  CEF   1,00  CEF   1,00 
BRADESCO   1,00  BRADESCO   1,00  BRADESCO   1,00 
ITAU   1,00  ITAU   1,00  ITAU   1,00 
UNIBANCO   1,00  UNIBANCO   1,00  UNIBANCO   1,00 
BANESPA   1,00  BANESPA   1,00  BANESPA   1,00 
ABN AMRO    1,00  ABN AMRO    1,00  REAL  0,92 
SANTANDER  BRASIL  0,72  SAFRA   1,00  BANRISUL   0,64 
SAFRA   1,00  NOSSA  CAIXA   1,00  HSBC   0,86 
HSBC   0,85  BANKBOSTON   1,00  NOSSA  CAIXA   1,00 
NOSSA  CAIXA   1,00  SANTANDER  BRASIL   0,47  SAFRA   1,00 
BANKBOSTON   1,00  CITIBANK   1,00  SANTANDER  BRASIL  0,45 
CITIBANK   1,00  HSBC   0,65  SUDAMERIS   0,78 
BBA-CREDITANSTALT   1,00  BBA-CREDITANSTALT   1,00  ABN  AMRO   1,00 
SUDAMERIS   0,78  SUDAMERIS   0,72  CITIBANK   1,00 
BILBAO VIZCAYA    0,38  BILBAO VIZCAYA    0,40  BBA-CREDITANSTALT    1,00 
BNB   0,78  BANDEIRANTES   0,66  BANKBOSTON   1,00 
MERCANTIL SP    0,86  MERCANTIL FINASA    0,59  MERCANTIL FINASA    0,58 
BANRISUL   0,77  BNB   1,00  BNB   0,98 
VOTORANTIM   0,56  MERIDIONAL   0,51  MERIDIONAL   0,55 
LLOYDS   0,94  BANRISUL   0,76  BILBAO  VIZCAYA   0,39 
CHASE  0,31  BANESTADO   0,59  BANDEIRANTES   0,71 
ALFA   1,00  LLOYDS   1,00  BANESTADO   0,48 
CSFB GARANTIA  1,00  VOTORANTIM    0,68  BOAVISTA    0,37 
SANTOS   1,00  BOAVISTA   0,40  VOTORANTIM   1,00 
RURAL   0,82  CSFB  GARANTIA  0,56  LLOYDS   0,91 
MERCANTIL DO BRASIL  0,69  CHASE  0,39  CHASE  0,83 
BASA   0,65  ALFA   1,00  BBM   1,00 
DRESDNER   1,00  RURAL   0,65  RURAL   0,63 
BBM   1,00  DEUTSCHE   1,00  CSFB  GARANTIA  1,00 
ABC-BRASIL   0,64  JP  MORGAN   0,52  PONTUAL   1,00 
BANESTES   0,90  BARCLAYS  GALICIA   1,00  ING   1,00 
EUROPEU  0,37  DRESDNER   1,00  BANEB   1,00 
BNL   0,50  BBM   1,00  DRESDNER   1,00 
MORGAN   1,00  BASA   0,88  DEUTSCHE   0,68 
DEUTSCHE   1,00  BEG   0,52  BIC   0,64 
ING   1,00  BIC   0,55  BESC   0,61 
BARCLAYS GALICIA  1,00  MERCANTIL DO BRASIL  0,52  JP MORGAN    0,79 
BIC   0,58  ING   1,00  BMB   0,47 
PACTUAL   0,78  PACTUAL   0,55  BARCLAYS  GALICIA   1,00 
BESC   1,00  BANESTES   1,00  BMC   0,80 
FIBRA   1,00  BEAL   0,62  CREDIBANCO   1,00 
TOKYOMITSUBISHI   1,00  ABC-BRASIL   1,00  BASA   0,60 
BRASCAN   0,62  CREDIBANCO   0,79  TOKYOMITSUBISHI   1,00 
BRB   1,00  BNL   0,67  FIBRA   1,00 
RABOBANK   1,00  TOKYOMITSUBISHI   1,00  BMG   1,00 
FININVEST   1,00  BMC   0,90  BEG   0,54 
SS   1,00  AGF  BRASEG  1,00  PACTUAL   0,80 
BEG   0,88  BRB   1,00  BEAL   1,00 
BMC   0,75  FIBRA   1,00  BRB   1,00 




1997 Fi(y,x/V,S)  1996  Fi(y,x/V,S) 1995  Fi(y,x/V,S)
CEF   1,00  CEF   1,00  CEF   1,00 
BB   1,00  BB   1,00  BB   1,00 
BANESPA   1,00  BANESPA   1,00  BANESPA   1,00 
ITAU   1,00  BRADESCO   1,00  BRADESCO   1,00 
BRADESCO   1,00  ITAU   1,00  UNIBANCO   1,00 
UNIBANCO   1,00  UNIBANCO   1,00  ITAU   1,00 
REAL 0,88  REAL  1,00  BAMERINDUS    0,94 
NOSSA CAIXA    1,00  BAMERINDUS    0,67  REAL  1,00 
BEMGE    0,41  NOSSA CAIXA    1,00  NOSSA CAIXA    1,00 
BANRISUL   0,53  BANRISUL   1,00  BANRISUL   0,68 
SAFRA   1,00  CREDIREAL   0,43  SAFRA   1,00 
HSBC  BAMERINDUS   0,59  SAFRA   1,00  CREDIREAL   0,40 
BAMERINDUS   1,00  CITIBANK   1,00  BANERJ   0,76 
BCN   0,79  BCN   0,73  BCN   0,92 
BANKBOSTON   0,81  BANESTADO   0,91  BNB   1,00 
CITIBANK   1,00  SUDAMERIS   0,95  BANESTADO   1,00 
BANESTADO   0,58  BANKBOSTON   0,55  SUDAMERIS   1,00 
BOAVISTA   0,41  MERCANTIL  SP   0,55  CITIBANK   1,00 
SUDAMERIS   0,94  BOAVISTA   0,46  BANKBOSTON   0,37 
BBA-CREDITANSTALT 1,00 BNB    0,72  BBA-CREDITANSTALT  0,91 
MERCANTIL  SP   0,65  BBA-CREDITANSTALT  0,78  MERCAPAULO   0,59 
EXCEL 0,52  BOZANO,SIMONSEN    1,00  BOAVISTA    0,66 
BNB   0,64  BANDEIRANTES   0,67  LLOYDS   0,57 
ABN AMRO    1,00  BBV BANCO    0,42  AMERICA DO SUL    0,95 
BANDEIRANTES   0,78  AMERICA  DO  SUL   0,85  BCO  BFB   0,89 
BOZANO,SIMONSEN   0,58  ABN  AMRO   1,00  BOZANO,SIMONSEN   1,00 
AMERICA  DO  SUL   0,80  LLOYDS   0,44  ABN  AMRO   0,57 
LLOYDS   1,00  BEMGE   0,56  BEMGE   0,79 
GARANTIA 0,87  BMC    0,58  MERIDIONAL    0,82 
CHASE  0,60  BIC   0,46  BCO  BANDEIRANTES   0,49 
JP  MORGAN   0,98  MERIDIONAL   0,52  PONTUAL   0,85 
VOTORANTIM   1,00  CHASE  0,63  BANEB   0,73 
SANTANDER BRASIL  0,31  PONTUAL    0,87  BANCO BMC    0,90 
MERIDIONAL   0,69  BANEB   0,75  BESC   0,74 
BANEB   0,86  BESC   0,77  DIBENS   1,00 
BIC   0,51  DIBENS   1,00  JP  MORGAN   1,00 
BESC   0,63  PACTUAL   1,00  BMB   0,72 
FIBRA   0,65  FIBRA   0,50  EXCEL   0,95 
BMC   0,69  BMB   0,45  PACTUAL   1,00 
ING  BANK   0,61  DEUTSCH   1,00  CREDIBANCO   1,00 
CREDIBANCO   0,77  CREDIBANCO   0,82  VOTORANTIM   1,00 
PONTUAL   0,87  RURAL   0,41  BRB   1,00 
PACTUAL   0,87  BMG   1,00  BIC   0,84 
DIBENS   1,00  BRB   1,00  CHASE  MANHATTAN   1,00 
RURAL   0,36  JP  MORGAN   0,82  DEUTSCHE   1,00 
BARCLAYS    0,79  GERAL DO COMERCIO  0,50  FIBRA    0,91 
DEUTSCHE   0,64  BANESTES   0,91  RURAL   0,78 
BMG   1,00  BNL   0,87  BASA   0,80 
BMB   0,53  BASA   0,80  BMG   1,00 
BRB    1,00  VOTORANTIM    1,00  GERAL DO COMERCIO  0,87 
AVERAGE 0,78  AVERAGE  0,79  AVERAGE  0,87 
 